We study the effects of the minimum wage in Peru over income and employment by considering the seven changes registered between 2002 and 2011. Data comes from the EPE (Encuesta Permanente de Empleo) for Lima Metropolitan Area and from the ENAHO (Encuesta Nacional de Hogares) for the national analysis. We merge the information of the monthly household surveys and by doing so we are able to measure the job-to-job transitions as well as the income dynamic due to minimum wage changes. We estimate that about 1 million workers have an income by main occupation in the neighbourhood of the minimum wage.
Introduction
The minimum wage in Peru was first introduced in 1962.
1 It has gone under different denominations throughout time. Currently, it is called minimal vital remuneration (remuneración mínima vital, RMV). The study of the dynamic effects of the minimum wage in the context of the Peruvian economy is of great interest since this country has experienced a remarkable transformation during the last two decades, including a period of persistent economic growth (5.5% of average yearly GDP growth during 1 the first decade of 2000). The minimum wage has been raised several times in the last ten years. It is ambiguous what the impact of these policies has been, because of the bonanza experienced by the country -which might facilitate the absorption of increases in the minimum wage-and because of the inherent difficulties in the enforcement of these regulatory changes in the context of a labour market that is still predominantly informal.
The effects of the minimum wage in the Peruvian labour market have been studied from different perspectives. Chacaltana (2006) provides a survey of this literature and notes that in all studies it is found that increases in the minimum wage lead to reductions in average employment levels.
2 Cespedes (2006) , Jaramillo y Lopez (2006) and Del Valle (2009) confirm these findings. A key aspect to bear in mind is that in Peru there is a high concentration of workers whose earnings are located in the neighbourhood of the minimum wage, which might explain these results.
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However, a limitation from these studies is that the empirical identification relies on only one change in the minimum wage, observed in 2003. However, there have been several changes in the minimum wage in the last decade. Since there have been a persistent economic growth during the same time period, it is unclear whether previous result ought to hold. Also, previous studies do not look at the effects of the minimum wage on job mobility. Moreover, neither the effects of the changes in minimum wage over informality nor its possible repercussions over employment of small firms are discussed.
The literature has also provided evidence of the effects of the changes in minimum wage over earnings outcomes. Minimum wage changes can affect the income distribution by directly affecting the income of formal workers and by indirectly affecting the income of informal workers. This is the so called lighthouse effect, which seems to be relevant in several studies worldwide. For Peru, the relationship between income and minimum wage was studied by Yamada y Bazan (1994) , Jaramillo y Lopez (2006) and Cespedes (2006) , among others. However, as in the previous case these studies base their identification in one specific increase in the minimum wage observed in 2003. The exception is Yamada y Bazan, who use a time-series econometric approach.
In this paper, we revisit the impact of the minimum wage in the Peruvian labour market. We differentiate ourselves from the previous literature in two aspects. First, we will track all the modifications in the minimum wage observed throughout the last decade to identify our results. Second, we will look at the impact on a range of outcomes, including employment status, job mobility, informality and the income of workers.
Specifically, we will analyze seven changes in the minimum wage from 2003 to 2011 by using a comparable database that records the working status of workers as well as the duration of employment and unemployment in the context of changes in the minimum wage. We provide an identification strategy that allows to capture the changes in the employment status as well as the income of workers who are directly affected by changes in the minimum wages. This identification is based on the employment status of a panel of workers as well as their duration of employment and unemployment. 4 The methodology also provides some evidences of the indirect effects of the minimum wage on both employment status and income. Summing up, by using a comparable database and also using our identification strategy, we are able to perform a comprehensive evaluation of the various effects of the changes in minimum wage over employment, informality, and the workers income. We aim to provide answers to the following relevant questions: are changes in the minimum wage important in the job market (in terms of employment and income)? has its importance changed throughout the last decade? how significant is the minimum wage in terms of job mobility? does the minimum wage foster informality? As we mentioned before, the available studies cover specific periods during a decade. They also cover a relevant database to identify the effects of the minimum wage and see if their importance has changed throughout the last decade of study. 4 In order to identify the effects of the minimum wage on employment we need to observe whether the employed workers are still employed after the change in the minimum wage. The database that captures this effect is the EPE (Encuesta Permanente de Empleo). This survey registers the employment status of a group of workers twice, two monthly based observations with a 3-month lag. By using the duration of employment we can identify if the workers do not experience job to job transitions. By using this database, once the minimum wage changes we can observe the employment status of the workers after three months. This data covers only the Lima Metropolitan area, which can be a limitation since it represents only 30% of the population. The data that covers Peru is the ENAHO (Encuenta Nacional de Hogares). However, this database only has yearly base panel observations that may not be proper to capture the short term effects of minimum wage changes. The EPE allows us to capture both short term and long term effects of the minimum wage changes.
According to the EPE (Encuesta Permanente de Empleo), around 20% of employed workers register job-to-job transitions towards a quarter, after having experienced short spells of unemployment or short spells of inactivity (out of the labour market) within a quarter. Therefore, we identify the effects of the minimum wage on employment status (or income) within a quarter when we take into account job mobility. One interesting issue that is of interest in the context of the Peruvian economy is related to the relationship between minimum wage and labour informality. Our procedure is able to capture this: those who change jobs induced by the change in the minimum wage can move from formal to informal job within a quarter. If this change is statistically significant we will be able to suggest that the minimum wage fosters informality in the labour market. In the same manner, we study the heterogeneous effects in the changes in the minimum wage according to the size of the company and different categories in the job market.
This document is divided in 6 sections. Section 2 presents the data used in the formal estimation and the motivation of the study. Section 3 shows the descriptive statistics. Section 4 is dedicated to the study of the effects of the minimum wage on employment. Section 5 illustrates the effects of minimum wage over income and/or salaries. Section 6 summarizes the main results.
The data
The data comes from the EPE, which is done on a monthly basis by the Peru National Bureau of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática in spanish, INEI). The EPE is a survey specially conceived to trace labour market related aspects in Lima Metropolitan Area. This geographic area comprehends 43 districts in the Province of Lima and 6 districts in the Constitutional Province of Callao.
One of the main characteristic of this survey is that individuals who are interviewed each month include a share of the sample (panel) who was interviewed three months ago. The panel sample rotates partially each quarter in such a way that individuals in the panel sample are interviewed twice in two consecutive quarters. In this paper, we build a sequence of the quarterly unbalanced panel samples, from the second quarter of 2002 to the first quarter of 2012. For the analysis we only loot at individuals that reported having a job in the previous interview. The complete panel sample built in this way shows a total of 118,548 individuals, of which 99,933 were employed at the time of the most recent interview. The rest are unemployed or inactive workers.
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The size of the quarter sample in the EPE in the year 2011 is 4,800 households and 1,500 households in 2001. The level of inference of the quarter panel data is statistically significant, since approximately 30% of the total sample is panel. In this way, in 2011 the total quarter sample is of approximately 18,500,000 people. Additionally, the size of quarter sample of the EPE has being increasing throughout time. As a result, the estimates obtained from EPE are currently more precise than at the beginning of the survey.
3 Descriptive statistics and the profile of minimum wagers Data from EPE is used to characterize individuals with an income around the minimum wage in Lima Metropolitan Area. All workers, whether formal or informal, are included. In doing so, not only workers that earn the minimum wage by regulation but also those that earn about the same level of monthly income by informal arrangement are considered.
We provide a demographic profile as well as the type of economic activities in where minimum wagers are involved. As an operative definition, workers who earn a monthly income that is between the minimum wage +/-100 soles are considered as minimum wagers.
5 Results are reported in tables 1, 2 and 3. We use data from a pooled sample of EPE surveys (from the first quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2009) in order to increase sample size.
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It is found that approximately 18% of the economically active population earn an income within the minimum wage +/-100 soles range (Table 1) . Among their main characteristics (Table 2) , on average they are younger compared to the population of reference (34 versus 36 years). 53.7% are men; most of them (81%) work on relatively small firms and lack health insurance (72%). In some of our we use access to health insurance as a proxy to determine if the individual is formally employed.
In terms of job category, 34% self-report as white-collar workers, 31% independents and 24% as blue-collar workers. They are well diversified within occupations (Table  3) , including independent workers in the retail sector, blue-collar workers in the man-ufacturing sector, house workers, among others. In unreported results, we show that minimum wagers are distributed across many different occupations in the Lima area. 2007, 2008 and 2009 . We use data from a pooled sample of years to produce these statistics in order to increase sample size. This is important for the analysis because the sample is divided in a large number of cells.
Minimum wage and income
The minimum wage is related to the salaries and/or income of workers in different ways. The formal explanation of this trend can be illustrated by using a diagram of labour supply and demand.
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The minimum wage imposes a friction in this market and it becomes a relevant variable when the equilibrium wage and the minimum wage are close enough. This would be a particular case to bear in mind for Peru where the value of the minimum wage represents 60% of the average income, or alternatively, 70% of the median income. In this section we utilize recent information that allows us to identify some of the regularities of the effects of the minimum wage over workers income, procedure that may help to complement the current knowledge of minimum wage effects in Peru. We also study the lighthouse effect of the minimum wage. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that an important portion of workers who receive an income are in the neighbourhood of the minimum wage. The Peruvian data suggests that the changes in income are related to future movements or adjustments in the monthly workers income. This could suggest that there is statistical causality that goes from the minimum wage to the income of workers.
Minimum wage and mean salary
The ratio minimum wage/median income is approximately 0.6 in Lima. This ratio has shown an increasing trend during most of the 2000 decade. This tendency was registered since 1993 (using data from MTPS). Nevertheless, at the end of the 2000 decade and at the beginning of 2010 we find a slight reduction in this ratio. In such a way, that we find similar levels that at the beginning of the 2000-decade. This last result is similar if we use different indicators of the salary such as the estimated income by the EPE, or GDP per-capita or the income and salaries estimated by the MTPS for workers who work in companies of 10 or more workers. Note: INEI, BCRP.
As an explanation to this regularity, during the first seven years of the 2000s, the minimum wage policy was very active and the changes were proportional to the average salary increases. Between 2008 and 2010 no changes in the minimum wage were registered and the significant growth in average income drives the negative trend of this ratio. After two changes in minimum wage (2010 and 2011) , we see a slight growth in this ratio. In average, the ratio minimum wage/income in 2011 is similar to the ratio at the beginning of the 2000s.
In what follows we show microeconomic evidence that comes from the last seven changes in the minimum wage in Peru that suggest that the causality goes from minimum wage to average income in the economy. Even though the evidence comes from Lima, we claim that the minimum wage works as an important benchmark in the determination of salaries, this because most individuals with formal jobs seem to earn around the neighbourhood of the minimum wage.
At the end of the decade the concentration of workers who receive an income close to the neighbourhood of the minimum wage is higher than that at the beginning of the 9 2000s. This implies that at the end of the decade, the changes in the minimum wage would have a larger effect on income with respect to the beginning of the decade. This is particularly true for the formal workers. These regularities are related to the increase of the number of salaried workers (INEI) as well as to the reduction of informality in the labour market during the 2000s (Rodriguez and Higa, 2010) . Figure 2 compares the income distribution around the minimum wage in 2003 and 2011 . The distribution is narrower near the neighborhood of the minimum wage in 2011. This may suggest that there is a tendency to receive salaries closer to the minimum wage.
An additional element which illustrates the direct and/or indirect short run effects in minimum wage is measured by comparing the distribution of income before and after the change in minimum wage. The panel sample from the EPE allows us to identify the employment status of workers before and after the change in minimum wage. Figure 3 illustrates, as an example, this comparison for the change in minimum wage in August 2011. Notice that this procedure help to capture only the short run distributive effects of the minimum wage since we only compare the income of two consecutive quarters. From the figure, we can identify a displacement towards higher salaries in the neighbourhood of the minimum wage, while the rest of the distribution does not experience significant changes. The lack of changes is more pronounced amongst formal workers while informal workers experience marginal changes. This exercise is repeated for the last seven changes in the minimum wage and similar results are found in six out of seven of the cases, as it is illustrated in Figures 6 and 7 (see Appendix). The Peruvian labour market regulation allows a certain degree of indexation in the minimum wage with some components in the salary, in such a way that the increases in the minimum wage have direct effects over some workers, mainly formal workers even if we consider that in the aggregate they earn more than the current minimum wage.
8 Among these concepts, the one which would have a larger cover would be the family compensation, because it is not proportional to the income. According to the characterization of minimum wagers, approximately 18% of workers would be directly affected by changes in the minimum wage, while the rest of the workers, mostly informal, would be indirectly affected. The indirect effect is found in the informal sector of the economy. Figure 3 shows that there is no clear clustering of salaries around the minimum wage in the informal market. The average informal income is close to the minimum wage and all the distribution of informal salaries is displaced in a similar proportion to the changes in minimum wage (see Figure 7 in the Appendix). This would alter the effects of the minimum wage in the long run. 
Causality test
The previous results suggest that changes in the minimum may have short run effects in the average income of the workers who receive salaries in the neighbourhood of the current minimum wage. This analysis does not allow us to capture the dynamics of the workers for more than a quarter. However, the suggested indirect effects as well as the heavy concentration of workers who perceive incomes around the minimum wage during the whole decade of study (see Figure 3) , suggest that salaries in the long run would relocate around the minimum wage, following the increases in the minimum wage. These evidences, which are mainly supported by microeconomic data, lead us to the discussion of whether changes in minimum wage cause changes in income and salaries in aggregate terms. We perform the tests of causality a-la-Granger by using different definitions of remunerations with data from the EPE and we find that the minimum wage causes (in a statistical sense) income a-la-Ganger. Table 7 shows tests that support the results.
The causality test is done with quarterly data, in real terms, that has been cleaned of all seasonal effects. Moreover, causality tests were done with filtered data from the cycle of each variable.
10 The causality test cleaning the effect from the trend is done since we need to control for the potential effects of a third variable that could affect both indicators, which could potentially lead to a spurious correlation between minimum wage and income. It is reasonable to assume that both the minimum wage and the income could be influenced by economic development or by economic growth. In this way, the correlation between minimum wage and income (causality) could be due to the correlation between the growth components of each one of the series. In other words, the apparent causality between minimum wage and salaries would be spurious under the last argument.
The tests of causality suggest that the minimum wage causes the average income in Lima among dependent workers and among adequately employed workers as it is shown in Table 7 .
11 Similar evidences are found in Yamada (1994) and in Cespedes (2005) for previous decades by using other sources of information for salaries.
Minimum wage and income: A formal model
A rigorous analysis to measure the relationship between minimum wage and income is done through an equation that specifies income at the level of workers. This equation includes several controls to capture the heterogeneity of change in income. Those indicators also capture the seasonality of the series and additional controls (demographics) that allow us the capture of the best way among the available information in the required relationship. This equation would be the micro-representation of the aggregated causality analysis developed in the previous section, allowing us to measure the magnitude of the relationship between minimum wage and income.
We estimate an equation of the determinants of income. The specification is as 10 The trend is estimated by using the HP filter as well as the linear trend approach (lon-lin regression). Note, however, that these calculations are preliminary due to data limitations: our time series observations are limited to one decade where we have observed only one business cycle.
11 The causality tests with nominal variables suggest a strong causality that goes form minimum wage to income (see Table 7 ).
However, it does not capture the pure correlation of minimum wage and income since it may be affected by prices or some other aggregate variable. We aisle both the effects of prices and the aggregate trend by using a linear filter (log-lin regression) that allows to estimate the cycle component of each variable. After controlling for the trend, the causality a-la-Granger that goes from minimum wage to income is weak. However, we can still support the claim that this causality is strong if we consider only the income of salaried workers and adequately occupied workers. This result is consistent with the micro economic evidences provided before.
follows,
where logY i,y,m is the log of monthly income of individual i interviewed in year y, month m; logRM V y,m is the log of the minimum wage prevalent in the same time period; X i is a vector of controls that include gender, educational attainment, years of experience (including a quadratic term), a dummy for whether the individual is the head of the household, and the following characteristics observed 3 months before: job category (independent, white-collar worker, blue-collar worker, house worker and other categories), number of employees in the firm, and individual income divided by the minimum wage. The last two variables and educational attainment are included in categories. The model is estimated conditional if the individual reports having a job in an interview 3 months before. The model also includes yearly and monthly fixed effects (α y and α m , respectively). They allow us to control for trends in income over time (possibly associated to business cycles) and for the seasonality of economic activities.
Main results
Based on this specification, we obtain a statistically significant minimum wage to income elasticity, with a point estimate of 0.25 (see Table 8 ). In other terms, an increase in the minimum wage by 10% increases income by 2.5%. Note that this reflects an average effect. Those who earn significantly more than the minimum wage are less likely to be affected by the increase. Similarly, informal workers might not benefit or might benefit only partially from the increase.
Minimum wage and inflation
The minimum wage shifts salaries according to the previous results. However, after applying the economic procedures of the salaries towards inflation by using a monetary model the causality seems to be rather weak. These monetary models, that correlate the unit labour cost with income rigidities, allow us to model the contribution of the income pressure over inflation.
14 5 Minimum wage and employment
In this section we study the relationship between minimum wage and employment. The literature is vast, for a worldwide survey see Flinn (2011) and for the Peruvian case studies see Jaramillo and Lopez (2005) , Del Valle (2009), Cespedes (2006), among others. The general conclusion of all these studies for the Peruvian case is that the minimum wage has negative effects on employment. There are, nevertheless, studies that suggest that the minimum wage could have positive effects on employment (see Garavito, 1993) . In order to study this relationship, we use the information provided by the EPE, which allows us to track labour transitions in the context of changes in the minimum wage. Our approach allows us to capture not only the transitions in employment towards unemployed and/or towards inactivity but also toward another job (job to job transitions). We use the job duration data to estimate the short term job to job transitions in the context of a changing minimum wage.
The previous point is particularly important in Peru because the aggregate statistics about employment could not capture adequately the short term job mobility which may be driven by changes in the minimum wage. The employment status of the same worker is observed with a three months lag. These two observations of the same worker does not allow us to identify if this worker has experienced a short spell of unemployment. In a context of changes in the minimum wage, it is possible to observe the same individual working before and after the change in minimum wage and if we do not control for this short term unemployment spell we cannot observe the job lost due to rise of the minimum wage. Given that the unemployment duration in Peru is short, between 12-15 weeks (Chacaltana, 2000; Daz y Maruyama, 2000) 12 , then the quarterly separation between two consecutive employment status does not allow us to identify the likely destruction (or not) of jobs due to a change in minimum wage. We need to estimate job-to-job transitions in order to identify the role of the minimum wage in employment transitions. The importance of job-to-job transitions in the identification of the short run effects of the minimum wage on employment are illustrated in Figure 4 . The second graph of this figure shows the job-to-others categories transitions (unemployment, inactivity or other jobs) according to the range of current income before the increase in minimum wage. We present the transitions of the treatment group, with the transition before and after the change in minimum wage, as well as a group control, which is the same transition for a year before).
13 This Figure also shows that there is a small difference between the treatment group and the control in the current minimum wage interval before the increase in minimum wage in August 2011(2011b) and other terms, the job-to-others categories mobility induced by changes in the minimum wage does not seem to be significant for this indicator.
On the other hand, the situation turns out to be more interesting if we consider only job-to-job transitions induced by changes in the minimum wage. This situation is registered in the first graph of Figure 4 , where a higher job mobility is found in the current minimum wage interval for the treatment group with respect to the control group. This is for those workers who were exposed to the changes in minimum wage in August 2011. Notice that the extremes in the income distribution the job mobility is similar for both the treatment and the control group. The previous procedure is applied to all the registered changes in minimum wage during the 2000s, and the results are consistent with the ones previously mentioned in the majority of the cases, with the exception of 2008 as it shown in Figure 8 (see Appendix). This reinforces the argument that the effects of the minimum wage over job mobility are registered mostly in the neighbourhood of the current minimum wage.
We can extend this analysis to other indicator of transitions of the labour market. Considering for example the unemployment to employment transitions, minimum wage may reduce the job creation for those workers that expect to receive an income close to the minimum wage. We do not find a support to these hypothesis since we cannot identify a strong movement in the neighborhood of the minimum wage once the minimum wage changes as it is shown in Figure 12 . In a similar fashion, Figures 10, 11 y 13 shown that minimum wage changes may not have a clear effect in other employment transitions. 
Note: The figure represents the proportion of employed workers who change to other labour category by income range (panel a) and job-to-job transitions by income range (panel b) (EPE, Lima
Metropolitan Area). The x axis is in fractions of the current minimum wage. The dashed line represents the quarterly job mobility indicator of the treatment group, or before and after the current minimum wage increase, while the continuous line denotes the control group, which is the quarterly job mobility indicator in the same months a year ago.
Minimum wage and employment: a formal model
Using the previous results as a motivation, we estimate a discrete response probit model to capture the relationship between the minimum wage and employment status. We consider the following functional form
+ρRM V y,m + X i Ω + µ i,y,m ) where P r(E i,y,m ) takes the value of 1 if individual i is employed in month m of year y; RM V y,m is the prevalent minimum wage in the same time period; X i is a vector that contains the same control variables used in equation 2. As in Section 4.3, the model also includes yearly and monthly fixed effects (α y and α m , respectively) and is estimated conditional on the individual having had a job as reported in an interview 3 months before. The result of interest is the elasticity of the minimum wage to the probability of being employed, conditional on having a job 3 months ago. 
Main results
In Table 9 , column 1 (see Appendix), the coefficients associated to the model described in Equation 2 are presented using data from EPE (Lima Metropolitan Area). These results imply a negative, statistically significant relationship between minimum wage and employment. In column 2, the model allows for differential effects according to job category: independent, blue-collar, white-collar, house workers and other categories. In this case, results suggest that the relationship initially found holds also for independent workers. To have a better sense of the results, elasticities derived from these two models are reported in Table 6 . The minimum wage -employment elasticity for the average individual in the sample is -0,25; a 10% increase in the minimum wage reduces employment by 2.5%. Highest values of the elasticity are observed for those self-reported as blue-collar and white-collar workers, whereas those self-reported as independent workers are the less affected by changes in the minimum wage regulation. The average impact of the minimum wage on employment is likely to mask some heterogeneity. A priori those with a formal job are more likely to be affected because formal firms are required by law to fulfill labour market regulations. Similarly, those Note: Both graphs report minimum wage-employment elasticities. In the graph on the left, elasticities are reported by relative income groups (the relative income is the individual income reported 3 months before the interview divided by the minimum wage prevalent then). In the graph on the right, individuals are classified according to the size of the firm where they worked three months before.
who earn the minimum wage, or around it, are likely to be the target of job cuts. To take into account these possibilities, we re-estimate our employment model allowing for heterogeneous minimum wage effects according to the following characteristics three months before: (a) whether or not the individual had health insurance in his job (a proxy of formal employment); (b) position of the individual in the income -minimum wage ratio distribution; and, (c) size of the firm. Results for (b) and (c) are shown graphically in Figure 5 . Full results are reported in Table 10 (in the Appendix). 15 We observe that workers without health insurance, with lower income levels and working on small firms are the most affected by increases in minimum wage. We find that not only those that earned around the minimum wage are affected, but also those that earned less than the minimum wage are affected. In fact, results suggest that those who earn less than the minimum wage are the most affected. In contrast, those that earn more than four times the minimum wage are not affected.
To check whether a similar relationship between minimum wage and employment can be found at the national level, we use data from the Peruvian National Household Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Hogares, ENAHO) to produce estimates of this elasticity distinguishing between rural areas, urban areas (excluding Lima) and Lima Metropolitan Area. For this exercise we can not replicate the model specified in equation 2. In this database we only have one observation for each individual, which implies that we can not condition the analysis on having had a job t months before, nor we can control for the characteristics of the occupation (firm size, income earned) at that moment of time. This implies that the results are not entirely comparable due to differences in the population of reference. Also, the data used for this estimation is a pooled sample from ENAHO corresponding to the years 2003 to 2010, 16 so we lose two of the seven changes in the minimum wage observed during the last ten years. It is interesting to observe that even with the caveats mentioned we obtain qualitatively similar findings in this case. Results are reported in Table 10 . For Lima Metropolitan Area we obtain a negative and statistically significant elasticity, albeit slightly smaller than that obtained using data from EPE: -0.16. An almost identical result is obtained for Urban Areas (excluding Lima area). On the other hand, an elasticity not statistically different from zero at standard confidence levels is obtained for rural areas. This is expected since labour markets are less formal in those areas of the country. 
Minimum wage and labour mobility
A change in the minimum wage might affect employment in ways that are not captured by the previous definition (1 if employed at the time of the interview, 0 otherwise, conditional on having had a job three months before). People who lose jobs might quickly find new ones (e.g., within less than a month). Depending on the exact timing of the household survey interviews and the changes in the minimum wage, it is possible that people who lost their jobs because of the increase in the minimum wage might 16 Data from ENAHO 2011 was not available at the time this analysis was produced.
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have found a new one by the time of the interview. If this is the case, previous results would be a lower bound of the true minimum wage -employment elasticity. To take into account this possibility, we estimate the change in the probability of retaining the same job compared to the alternative of having a new job. 17 Because this is a selected sample composed of individuals who have a job in both periods, we also present results comparing the probability of retaining the same job versus either having a new job, being unemployed or being inactive. This second definition is more comparable with our previous results. These elasticities are reported in Table 6 below. When using a similar definition to that used in subsection 5.1.1, we obtain a larger elasticity (in absolute value), as expected. On the other hand, when restricting the comparison to those that had a job in both periods the elasticity is smaller and becomes statistically insignificant. This difference might stem from the fact that this is a selected sample of workers with a higher job stability.
Minimum wage and informality
The previous model is modified to capture the transition from formal to informal employment. The dependent variable is defined as the probability to maintain a formal job compared to having an informal job, being unemployed or inactive at the moment of the interview. As before, the model is estimated conditional on having a job before the change in the minimum wage. The explanatory variables are also the same as before.
Lacking additional information about the type of contract a worker has, for practical purposes we define formality as having health insurance (public or private). This is only a proxy for formality: indeed, it is possible for a worker with health insurance to be informal (e.g., a worker can buy health insurance). When estimating the model using access to health insurance as a proxy for having a formal employment, we do not find evidence to support the claim that an increase in the minimum wage leads to a reduction in the average proportion of the population with formal jobs. In fact, the elasticity has a positive sign, however, it is statistically insignificant.
18 In other words, there does not seem to be the case that an increase in the minimum wage leads to more informality. Given that our informal employment indicator is weak due to data limitations we treat this result with caution.
Summary
We study the effects of the minimum wage in Peru over income and employment by considering the seven changes registered between 2002 and 2011. Data comes from the EPE to Lima Metropolitan Area and from the ENAHO for the national analysis. We merge the information of the monthly household survey and by doing so we are able to measure the job-to-job transitions as well as the income dynamic due to minimum wage changes. We estimate that about 1 million workers have an income by main occupation in the neighbourhood of the minimum wage, with a greater participation in some sectors and / or job categories (textiles, manufacturing, construction, trade, house workers, etc.). By using a model that explains the probability of being employed we estimate statistically significant minimum wage-employment elasticity for the average worker. Although on average both formal and informal workers are affected, those seemingly engaged in formal activities are hit harder. The evidence also suggests that those who receive low incomes and those working in small businesses are the most affected by increases in the minimum wage. Effects are monotonic decreasing in absolute terms by firm size, this is, and the effects of minimum wage changes are moderate in big firms and higher in small firms.
The minimum wage -employment elasticity is larger in absolute value (more negative) when assessing the probability that the individual is working in the same job in both periods. This suggests that part of the effect of the minimum wage changes on employment is cleared due to the ability of individuals to quickly re-insert in a dynamic labour market (recall the persistent economic growth during this decade). By estimating the model considering informality, we find that the increases in the minimum wage do not appear to reduce the probability of being formally employed. However, this results needs to be revisited with proper data, given that our informal employment indicator is weak due to data limitations.
Finally, we present evidence for the hypothesis that the minimum wage in Peru is a benchmark in determining the income of individuals (lighthouse effect). Causality tests, movement of the income distribution in the context of change of changes in the minimum wage, and the results provided by a model that captures the drivers of income justify these results. Note: The graphs represent the proportion of unactive people who change to employment by income range (EPE, Lima Metropolitan area). The x axis is in fractions of the current minimum wage.
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